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ABSTRACT 
Law No. 23/2007 on Railways is opening the option for private sector or Local Government to be involved in railways. This 
study investigated experiences from other countries in railway restructuring especially their measures and model of 
restructuration. The countries investigated are Germany, Japan, Britain, and Sweden. After investigating restructuration 
experiences from other countries and looking on Indonesian railway condition, the study developed two approach of 
restructuration.  
The first approach of restructuration was using vertical separation model. The approach has advantages of: eliminating 
potential discrimination from the current holding company, increase the transparency in railway fund management, and more 
competitive market. The disadvantages were the high transaction costs, a need for monitoring of the other’s performance, the 
difficulty in creating complex performance schedules. The second approach was using the integration model. It has advantages 
of lower transaction cost, easy to manage path allocation, and efficient scheduled design. The disadvantages were the misuse 
railway fund allocation, also potential discrimination to the new entrants. 
The study found that the separation model is still the best approach for restructuring Indonesian railway but if looking at the 
Indonesian railway current condition with its problem of backlog assets it would be better that the separation approach is used 
in the development of railway in other islands. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Flood that occurs periodically in dense populated area, 
particularly in urban area has caused damages and 
losses to physical structures, even loss of human lives. 
Flood in 1966 inundated almost 2/3 of Surakarta city 
including urban area. Inundation attained 1 m up to 2 
m depth and caused 90 people died.  
Indonesian railway has been a state-owned monopoly 
railway for two decades, since the implementation of 
Law No. 13/1992 on Railways, where one state-
owned company called PT. KAI (Indonesian Railway 
Company) was set up to be responsible for both 
infrastructure and train operations. During that period 
opportunities for improvement still remain, as do 
many problems such as poor infrastructure poor 
conditions, poor rolling stock condition, the limited 
network (only in Java and Sumatra Island), train 
accidents, and poor service quality. In the hope of 
improving the railway, in 2007 the Government issued 
Law No. 23/2007 on Railways replacing Law No. 
13/1992 on Railways, one of the important talking 
points is that the Government is opening the option 
for private sector or Local Government involvement 
in railways whether as infrastructure provider or train 
operator. Law No.23/2007 obligates an establishment 
of new institutional structures for the railway sector to 
replace the current monopolistic structure in 
Indonesia, encouraging intra-modal competition for 
railway services. Evidence suggests that substantial 
cost savings can be achieved by creating competition 
and private participation in the supply of the railway 
infrastructure facilities and train services (UNESCAP, 
2003). 
Mahardi (2011) concluded that although Law 
No.23/2007 brought new vision regarding railway 
restructuring program there are several preconditions 
that need to be considered and properly formulated to 
ensure the success of restructuring program. Those 
important preconditions are legal framework, asset 
assessment, human resource evaluation, and good 
governance and its support. Furthermore it was 
mentioned that the restructuring option could be a 
combination between horizontal separation and 
vertical separation. Horizontal separation could be 
based on regional separation like Japan railway 
example or functional separation like what happen to 
German railway. 
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2 METHODS OF RAILWAY RESTRUCTURING 
UNESCAP (2003) describe the three main dimensions 
that define the nature of the various restructuring 
scheme that have been done in recent years, which 
are: 
a) Vertical Structuring;  
b) Private Sector Participation;  
c) Degree of Competition.  
In many railways, especially in the European 
countries, the restructuring process involved 
separating the responsibility for infrastructure and 
railway operation through different organization. This 
process is called “vertical separation”. World Bank 
(2006) affirmed their position regarding this issue of 
vertical separation by saying that vertical separation is 
not desirable as an end in itself, but can be a valuable 
part of a wider package of structural reforms (for 
instance, to improve financial transparency) and it is 
important to make an assessment of its advantages and 
disadvantages considering the specific policy 
objectives and railway markets that exist in a 
particular country. For Indonesia case those objectives 
are depicted in the National Railway Master Plan 
(2010), which described the main objective of 
restructuring the railways is to reduce the Government 
expenses resulted from the railway operation and 
development. 
3 EXPERIENCES FROM OTHER COUNTRIES 
3.1.1 German Railway  
The background for German railway reform was the 
market share loss and means to reduce the load on the 
federal budget. The points that need to be taken 
regarding German railway reform measures is that the 
infrastructure organization (DB Netz) is completely 
free to decide the level and structure of the charges 
(Link, 2003). This lack of regulation to the track 
provider (DB Netz) became a major problem which 
hampered competition in the rail market and growth 
of market share by non-DB companies for at least 10 
years after the reforms, due to discrimination by DB 
AG on non-DB companies when running trains on DB 
Netz network (Link, 2009). Link (2009) further 
described that Germany has no sector-specific 
regulator with the same range of competences as the 
Office of Rail Regulation in the UK. However, in 
2005, Germany amended its Railway Law especially 
one, which concerned rail regulation and gave 
Bundesnetzagentur (the German regulator for 
electricity, gas, telecommunications, postal services 
and railways) responsibility for supervising the rail 
market, especially non-discriminatory access to rail 
infrastructure. This experience shows that regulating 
track authority is important for competition in the rail 
market and an organization with the responsibility for 
supervising the rail market, especially non-
discriminatory access to rail infrastructure is equally 
important. 
3.1.2 British Railway  
In British railway reform, the Government proposed 
for the privatization of and introduction of 
competition into British Rail, the reigning railway 
holding company. The main points of British rail 
reform according to Van de Velde, et al. (1998) is to 
change the monolithic structure of railway into an 
incentivized set of private sector companies with 
contractual arrangements and negotiated prices, where 
it was believed that it would lead to gains in 
productive, locative and dynamic efficiency. The 
British railway privatization is different from other 
European countries, while other countries give the 
responsibility of infrastructure, allocation of time 
slots, and the management of train traffic to a public 
authority, British railway give that responsibility to a 
private monopoly firm called Railtrack. In the few 
years after the privatization, it was evident that a 
private monopoly, which works to achieve its own 
objectives under its own constraints, could not 
manage the national rail network to the public good 
(Mathieu, 2003). Mathieu (2003) said that the 
numerous accidents and poor management of rail 
network drove the British Government to put 
Railtrack under administrative supervision in year 
2001. This new organization is called Network Rail, 
which is a nonprofit organization under the 
Government.  
3.1.3 Japanese Railway  
In the late 1970s, Japan’s Government was 
experiencing a financial crisis, as the financial 
structure was inflexible and could not adapt to the 
necessity of reducing expenditures and the deficits 
was generated by the Japanese National Railways 
(JNR), the Foodstuff Control Special Account, and the 
National Health Insurance System (Mizutani and 
Nakamura, 2004). To address these problems, Japan’s 
Government proposed the privatization of the three 
largest public corporations - JNR, Japan Monopoly 
Corporation (tobacco and salt), and Nippon Telegraph 
and Telephone Public Corporation (Fukui, 1992). In 
1950s, competition from other modes were intensified 
which made JNR lost its competitive edge in its 
market, except for the metropolitan areas and the 
bullet train networks while JNR's investments in 
infrastructure only increased its debt load which had 
reached $286 billion by the end of 1986 (Fukui, 
1992). In the Japanese railway case, Mizutani and 
Nakamura (2004) said that the best choices for 
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restructuring might be vertical integration and 
geographical separation, because of the highly dense 
population along the major railway lines and the 
extremely strong commuter demand in metropolitan 
areas. The thing that needs to be noted from the Japan 
railway restructuring is that the Japan’s Government 
took the approach of vertical integration and 
horizontal separation of its train operation division 
into six different passenger train companies and one 
freight company was based on their geographical 
factor of the railway network. One other thing that 
needs to be noted is that although JNR is vertically 
integrated, they use separate accounting so that the 
access could be granted fairly.  
3.1.4 Swedish Railway  
The Swedish system began as a state railway, named 
Statens Järnvagar (SJ), and this was created to provide 
links between regional railways and thereby connect 
the different regions in Sweden along with various 
regional private railways. When the private railways 
became bankrupt, the state railway absorbed or 
purchased their assets which led to monopoly; by 
1991, no private operator had rail track operations in 
Sweden (Carlson, 2004). Since the early 1960s until 
the mid of 1980s SJ continued to showed poor results 
and though Government kept increasing the support 
over the years, this proved to be insufficient to turn 
performance around, so Government loss its patience 
and decided that a more radical transformation was 
needed (Nilsson, 2003). The transformation of the 
regulatory framework of the Swedish railway has 
developed in a step like manner that can be identified 
in three major regulatory reforms, the Transport 
Policy Acts of 1979, 1988 and 1998 (Van de Velde, et 
al., 1998). The 1988 Act eventually led to a complete 
transformation of the railway regulation and railway 
operations, as the control over the rail network was 
given to Banverket and they rapidly developed interest 
in improving the rail network (improvements and new 
lines) and increasing competition (Van de Velde, et 
al., 1998). They further states that the most important 
things this Act brought to Sweden railway were the 
introduction of competitive tenders, the separation of 
infrastructure from railway operations, the creation of 
a coordinated national timetable and a national 
ticketing system, the permission to let a private firm 
hold a long-term license for a railway line, and a 
separation of infrastructure charges from the actual 
costs of infrastructure provision. 
To provide a better look at the restructuration 
approach between each country, the author make 
comparison based on: market structure, railway 
operation ownership, railway infrastructure 
ownership, and degree of separation, pricing 
regulation, and the background for reform. The 
comparison can be seen in Table 1 and Table 2. 
 
Table 1. Comparison between German Railway and Japanese Railway 
 
Germany Railway Japanese Railway 
Before After Before After 
Market 
structure 
Public company monopoly 
(Deutsche Bundesbahn and 
Deutsche Reichsbahn) 
Open for other train 
operator by paying 




Divided into 6 passenger         





Deutsche Bahn AG 
(Holding Company) 
Deutsche Bahn train 
operation unit and Non 





JR East, JR West, JR 
Central, JR Kyushu, JR 












Own by the passenger train 
operator and freight train 
operator pay access charge 















Controlled by the 
Government. 
Based on access charges 
set by DB Netz. 





Loss of market share, better use of rail capacity, 
reducing Government subsidy, handle the huge amount 
of (excessive) personnel of Deutsche Reichsbahn. 
Financial crisis, increasing debt, organizational 
structure and culture of JNR, loss of market 
share. 
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Table 2.  Comparison between Swedish Railway and British Railway 
 
Swedish Railway British Railway 






Open for other train 
operator by paying 
access charges to 
Banverket 
Public Company 
Monopoly (British Rail) 
25 franchise train operating 
company, freight train 







Statens Jarnvagar and 
other private operators 
British Rail Business 
Center (Intercity, 
Regional Railways, 
Network South East) 
25 franchise train operating 









British Rail (Public 
Company) 
Railtrack (pre Hatfield 
accident),  Network Rail 
(Post Hatfield accident) 
Degree of 
Separation 
Integration Vertical  separation Integration Vertical  separation  
Pricing 
Regulation 
Controlled by the 
Government 
Marginal social cost 
Controlled by the 
Government 
Set by franchisee 
Background 
for Reform 
Reducing Government subsidy, competition 
with other modes of transport (road), SJ lack of 
transparency 
Political intervention, introduce competition for the 
market, reducing Government intervention  
   
 
Figure 1.  Current Indonesian railway structure. (Lubis and 
Nurullah, 2007) 
Public Service Obligation (PSO) is compensation 
provided by the government, the basic price of which 
is defined by the difference between the production 
cost and noncommercial tariffs specified by the 
government (Lubis and Nurullah, 2007). In practice it 
is basically subsidy provided by Government to PT. 
KAI for the operation of economy class passenger 
trains. Infrastructure Maintenance and Operation 
(IMO) as the name suggest is a Government 
compensation for the cost of infrastructure 
maintenance and operation. The Track Access Charge 
is the expenses paid by the operator to the government 
for the use of railroad infrastructure. It is calculated 
based on IMO with infrastructure depreciation added 
together with an intermodal or inter-services 
balancing policy factors (Muthohar, 2010). Over the 
years, this funding mechanism is given in net form, 
one big package. In theory, the PSO scheme was a 
subsidy given by the Government to the current 
operator for the operational cost of running 
economical class passenger trains, and IMO was given 
for the cost of maintaining and operating the railway 
infrastructure, while TAC was the charge imposed on 
the operator for using the railway infrastructure 
owned by the Government. Giving it in net form 
means that there are no real cash flows applied in each 
scheme, and the current company has accepted the 
fund in a bundle without any specific allocation in its 
accounting. This means that sometimes the funds 
needed for maintaining the infrastructure are used for 
other expenses like rolling stock maintenance, staff 
salary, or the other way around. The system of PSO, 
IMO and TAC should be different entities, not given 
in net form which is calculated in aggregate as PSO + 
IMO – TAC (Muthohar, 2010). 
Not only that, there is also a problem of significant 
differences between the budget plan of the PSO 
contract and the actual cost. Muthohar (2010) points 
out that the problem is caused by differences between 
Government and the train operator (PT. KAI) in 
methods of calculating the operational cost for 
running economy class passenger trains. The 
Government calculated the net cost based on the 
difference between the total operational cost of each 
economy train and the total revenue of each economy 
train service, with the revenue calculated based on the 
standard tariff multiplied by the estimated load factor 
of the train. However, the train operator calculated the 
cost based on allocating the total operational costs of 
all train classes on a train-kilometer basis. This 
difference in fund calculation makes the railway does 
not have enough budgets to develop or maintain their 
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infrastructure and operation, causing backlog in both 
technology and assets. 
4 OPTIONS FOR INDONESIAN RAILWAYS 
The Indonesian government, through the Ministry of 
Transportation, has set policies regarding the 
development of railway institutions. The National 
Railway Master Plan (2011) notes that the goal of 
restructuring the railway is to encourage multi 
operator railway management, so that the railway does 
not need to depend solely on Government funds which 
all this time have not been sufficient in maintaining 
and developing the railway. By implementing a multi 
operator model the Government hopes that the private 
sector could help in terms of railway investments and 
industry development; the model could also increase 
cost transparency in railway operation. There are 
many methods of railway restructuring which the 
Government needs to take into consideration when 
examining options to be taken for the Indonesian 
railway. The option chosen should achieve the 
objective set by the Law No.23/2007 where it 
implicitly states that institutional change for 
infrastructure manager and railway operation and also 
about introducing competition to the railway industry. 
Profillidis (2006) argued that although competition 
can exist without separation but it could serve as a 
catalyst to introduce competition and facilitate the 
entrance of many rail operators. The vertical 
separation model is sometimes used to indicate a 
specific management model of railways, such as the 
model of European railway policy and many countries 
have used it in their reform processes, including 
Sweden and Britain. This model transfers the 
ownership of infrastructure to a separate organization 
from the operators, so that railway operators can be 
relieved of a huge amount of infrastructure capital 
costs and, in some cases, its maintenance costs as well 
(Kurosaki, 2008). Merkert, et al. (2008) in their paper 
discuss the effects of different institutional and 
contractual arrangements on the interactions between 
train operators and infrastructure manager in the three 
most liberalized rail systems in Europe: Sweden, 
Germany and Britain. In their opinion the clearest 
approach to avoid discrimination in access to rail 
infrastructure is through institutional separation of 
railway operation from rail infrastructure. 
Other study argued that separation is not the best 
option for restructuring the railways. Bitzan (2003) 
finds that separation would result in increased 
resource costs; as railroads are natural monopolies in 
providing transport services, the multi operator model 
when applied to railways would result in increased 
resource costs (though his study admittedly restricted 
to US freight railroads). Another study by Growitsch 
and Wetzel (2006) said that there was and still is 
concerns from many railways around the world that a 
separated structure of railway entity would result in 
much higher transaction costs than in an integrated 
model due to loss of economic scope. Looking at all 
those studies, there still seems to be an on-going 
argument about how the separation model could help 
reshape the railway to become more efficient, market-
driven and (in the Indonesian case), to help reduce the 
Government burden of maintaining and developing 
the railway and hence to encourage transparency and 
accountability in railway funding. 
Throughout the world, many attempts have been made 
to increase the role of the private sector in railway 
activities. Although the approach taken has varied 
from one country to another, the need to reshape the 
monopolistic railway into a market-sensitive transport 
entity is still a vital and universal objective (Moyer 
and Thompson, 1992). 
5 RESTRUCTURATION APPROACH 
5.1 Vertical Separation  
Mizutani and Nakamura (2004) said that because the 
railway business constitutes naturally monopolistic 
elements (such as track maintenance), and potentially 
competitive elements (such as train operations and 
commercial functions), unbundling track maintenance 
from train operations is one way to sharpen the 
competitive edge of railways in the transport market, 
in theory at least. Separation of infrastructure and 
railway operation could minimize or even avoid 
potential discrimination by the current train operator if 
the infrastructure is still in the same holding company. 
The potential discrimination could be in the form of 
difficulties for the new train operators to enter the 
railway market. As Obermauer (2001) point out, 
vertical separation is an indispensable precondition for 
allowing third parties a non-discriminative entry to the 
railway market. Based on those arguments, to 
encourage private sector participation in Indonesian 
railway industry, it is necessary to separate the 
infrastructure from the railway operation. The 
proposed restructuration approach (see Figure 2) is as 
follows: 
a) Before separation, Government and incumbent 
operator need to finish the re-evaluation of 
railway assets.  
b) Separating the infrastructure from railway 
operation. The infrastructure organization will be 
nonprofit oriented and it is under Government 
authority. It will be responsible for the timetabling 
of all services across the network, allocating paths 
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for train operators, collect track access charges 
from train operators and maintenance of the 
infrastructure. In the case that the train operator 
performance is interrupted due to problem caused 
by infrastructure, it will receive compensation 
from the infrastructure provider.  
c) There will be a new organization that acts as 
supervisory body for railways. This organization 
will be given the task of: 
 Supervise the implementation of regulation 
and standards applied,  
 Promoting competition and efficiency by 
overseeing if there is unfair business practices 
regarding infrastructure manager and train 
operators,  
 To monitor the execution of PSO,  
 To monitor and give recommendation on the 
fares policy,  
 Promoting the use of railways for freight 
transport.  
d) Create a new regulation regarding rule of conduct 
between infrastructure manager and train 
operators and another regulation concerning PSO, 
IMO and TAC scheme. The new regulation 
should comprise of calculation method for PSO, 
IMO and TAC. It should also contain the rule 
regarding the relationship of infrastructure 
manager and train operators. 
e) The new train operators will get their license from 
Directorate General of Railways. Licenses would 
specify safety, training, financial, and experience 
requirements. Licensing would require a 
time‐based renewal process and license holders 
would be required to be continuously in 
compliance with the terms of the license.  
f) A new incentive system will be implemented. 
There will be some type of performance penalty 
payment between operators, if one operator in its 
service causing the other operator service 
disrupted then the operator who causes it will pay 
penalty to the one whose service is disrupted. The 
amount of penalty will be determined from how 
long the disruption happens. By using this 
incentive system, it is hoped that train operators 
will be competing to operate efficiently and 
effectively, because otherwise the penalty will 
affect their income. 
5.2 Modified Integration Model  
As described in the previous section, the funding 
mechanism of PSO, IMO and TAC are given in net 
form and PT. KAI as the company who manage that 
fund have not separate their accounting, which causes 
the fund sometimes is used not on its intended 
purpose. This is the first issue that will be solved for 
this restructuration approach. Another issue of 
restructuring the railway without separating the 
infrastructure from operation is the barrier for entering 
the railway market for third parties, which in this case 
are private sector and Local Government. Carlson 
(2004) said that “an entry barrier is anything that 
requires expenditure by a new entrant into an industry, 
but imposes no equivalent cost upon an incumbent”.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Vertical separation structure of Indonesian Railway. 
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The Government hopes that the restructuration could 
change the railway industry into a more market 
responsive railway and introduce competition through 
other operator beside the current one, also to increase 
transparency and accountability of railway. Taking 
both issues into consideration, a new integrated 
structure of Indonesian Railways (see Figure 3) is as 
follows: 
a) Improving the accounting system of the holding 
company by separating the accounting for 
infrastructure and railway operation.  
b) Changing the calculation method of the current 
infrastructure charges as preparation for the 
introduction of competition between current 
operator and potential new operator.  
c) Increase the role of Directorate General of 
Railway infrastructure work units (SATKER) by 
adding its responsibilities from managing the 
infrastructure to give access agreement, setting 
TAC, overseeing fair competition between 
operators and possible practice that could hinder 
new operator to enter the railway market.  
d) Establish new regulation regarding Open Access 
railway. The regulation will comprise of technical 
and managerial standard for open access, contract 
length for the access and rules about contract 
extension or breach of contract. In the case of 
open access operator could not fulfilled the level 
of service required, the current holding company 
will take over the operation.  
e) Open up several routes for open access, both 
freight and passenger trains. The author proposed 
that the tender for the access will be conducted by 
Directorate General of Railways as regulator. The 
winner of the tender will be given privilege of 
setting its own fares.  
6 CONCLUSIONS 
The first approach which is the vertical separation 
model has advantages of eliminating potential 
discrimination from the current holding company, 
increase the transparency in railway fund 
management, and more competitive market. Because 
this model separates the management of infrastructure 
and operation, meaning that the chance for misuse of 
budget allocation is reduced, if other is not removed 
completely. Regarding the disadvantages of this 
model, it could be associated with problems like high 
transaction costs, a need for monitoring of the other’s 
performance, the difficulty in creating complex 
performance schedules, and the stimulation of 
incentives for the track authority to invest in new 
facilities to increase efficiency and improve safety 
(Mizutani and Nakamura, 2004). 
The integration model has advantages of lower 
transaction cost, easy to manage path allocation, and 
efficient scheduled design. In the proposed approach, 
to introduce competition into the Indonesian railway, 
new open access operators are allowed to enter the 
railway market through access agreement by the 
Government. The plan to change the method of 
infrastructure charging is also a positive point, since 
 
 
Figure 3.  New integrated structure of Indonesian Railway. 
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the current infrastructure charge calculation 
ineffective for maintaining and developing the 
infrastructure network. Possible disadvantages of this 
approach probably there is still chance of misuse 
railway fund allocation, also potential discrimination 
to the new entrants, could be by using force or foul 
practices. 
In the end it is up to the Government policy to choose 
which one is the best approach for Indonesian railway, 
from the author point of view the separation model is 
still the best approach for restructuring Indonesian 
railway for several reasons: firstly because it is 
implied by the Law that institutional changes is 
needed, it increase transparency in fund allocation and 
management of railway operation, improve 
management focus (since the infrastructure and 
operation are manage by different entity), and lastly it 
could encourage fair competition between current 
operator and new entrants. Considering the Indonesian 
railways current condition with its problem of backlog 
assets it would be better that the separation approach 
is use in the development of railway in other islands 
beside the current one. The other islands, aside from 
Java and Sumatra, could be the perfect place to 
implement the separation model since the railway 
assets like the rail, signaling, depot and station would 
be a new assets and the maintenance regime could be 
set up properly. 
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